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Japan Post Insurance is the largest insurance company in Japan - indeed, in the world when measured 
by assets ($1.1 trillion in March 2013).  Beyond the market power of sheer size, government 
ownership results in undue benefits because it enables inappropriate cross-subsidization, results in 
inefficiency and heightened risk, and violates international principles of national treatment for foreign 
firms participating in the domestic market. In short, government ownership raises issues of a tilted 
playing field. Further, economic theory provides no justification for the existence of Japan Post 
Insurance (JPI) as a government-owned institution. 
 The obvious conclusion is that JPI needs to be completely privatized in both form and 
substance. That is, not only should the government-owned Japan Post Holdings sell all shares of JPI 
to the public, the rules and regulations pertaining to the privatized firm should be identical to those 
for the rest of the insurance industry. If JPI is not privatized, then the government should regulate it in 
a manner that avoids the distortions analyzed in this paper. 
 This paper presents the arguments for these conclusions. It is a companion piece to an earlier 




   
Reform and privatization of the postal system has been an important policy issue in Japan for over a 
decade. In addition to providing postal services, Japan's post offices have offered savings accounts 
since 1875 and life insurance since 1916. 
 Originally, Kampo (the Japanese short-form for JPI) was part of the postal division of the 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. A general government restructuring in 2001 merged this 
ministry with other government agencies to form the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications. 
 In 2003, as part of a larger government reorganization, the postal businesses were transferred 
to the newly created Japan Post, which was structured as a stock corporation with all its shares held 
by the government. Under a 2005 law, in October 2007 Japan Post Insurance was created as one of 
four corporate entities each wholly owned by Japan Post Holdings (JPH), a holding company wholly 
owned by the government. Each of JPH’s four businesses was to be privatized over a ten-year period 
beginning in 2007. 
 Privatization remained controversial and its timetable was revised in a law passed in 2012 
while the Democratic Party of Japan controlled the government. Specifically, the deadline for JPH to 
dispose of all its shares in the postal savings and insurance companies by October 1, 2017 was 
changed to a requirement that JPH “shall aim to dispose of all of its shares in Japan Post Bank and 
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Japan Post Insurance and shall dispose [of such shares] as promptly as possible.”2 To date no shares 
have been sold, and the change in the language in the law is widely seen as a move to delay 
privatization and leave some residual government ownership.  
 Another result of the 2012 law was that on October 1, 2012 Japan Post Network Co, Ltd 
(owns and operates the physical facilities) and Japan Post Service Co, Ltd (delivers mail) merged. 
Japan Post Group now consists of Japan Post Holdings Co, Ltd and three subsidiaries: Japan Post Co, 
Ltd; Japan Post Bank Co, Ltd (JPB); and Japan Post Insurance Co, Ltd (JPI). The merged entity, 
Japan Post Company (hereafter, JPC), was given a specific mandate to provide universal service for 
delivery, banking, and insurance "on an integrated basis" at its post offices, ensuring that almost all 
post offices would continue to sell and service JPI policies. 
 This paper adopts the convention of labeling the pre-2007 insurance operation as Kampo and 
operations since 2007 as JPI. The formal Japanese name of JPI is Kabushiki Gaisha Kampo Seimei 
Hoken and it is branded as Kampo Seimei (seimei means life). 
 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) came back into power at the end of 2012 and has since 
been implementing an economic growth strategy dubbed Abenomics that includes an emphasis on 
structural reform. Preliminary indications are that as part of this overall economic policy initiative, 
the LDP-led government may adopt an approach to postal reform that would put privatization back on 
track. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has spoken in favor of forward movement on postal privatization. 
His Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshihide Suga, is also known to favor privatization (and voted against 
the 2012 legislation that weakened postal reform). 
 Appointment of a new CEO for Japan Post Holdings in May 2013 (bringing in a retired 
chairman of Toshiba Corporation – Taizo Nishimuro – to replace a former Ministry of Finance 
official also appeared to be a change in this direction. Mr Nishimuro’s arrival at JPH was 
accompanied by a broader set of personnel changes in upper management.3  
 It is conceivable that Prime Minister Abe will use renewal of postal privatization to gain the 
symbolic mantle of reform (by returning to the path of the pro-reform Koizumi government a decade 
earlier). Still, how privatization will play out remains to be seen.  
 
This story of attempted reform and privatization is emblematic of the overall difficulties that have 
faced regulatory reform in Japan. The public broadly supports the general concept of deregulation and 
privatization of government entities, but opposition in specific industries has often been strong and 
outcomes weak. The uncertain prospects for privatization of the postal system are particularly 
unfortunate because a variety of economic distortions and inefficiencies surrounds both Japan Post 




In Japan the insurance industry has two traditional sectors: life and property and casualty. In addition, 
there is a segment that supplements the national health insurance system (including long-term care). 
Foreign companies concentrate mainly on this third market, which had been relatively ignored by 
domestic firms. Although, since 1964 all the private-sector life insurers at the time began offering 
personal accident insurance that covered injuries and hospitalization as well as death.  
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 Originally Kampo provided simple, small life policies. When it began in 1916, there were 
two products – whole life insurance and endowment insurance – and they were limited in size to serve 
lower-income households that supposedly were not being served by private-sector firms. Today, 
however, JPI offers a broad array of products. These include term, four kinds of whole life, seven 
kinds of endowment policies (including two educational plans), annuities, and "asset-formation" 
plans.4  
 In addition, JPI offers two types of riders, one covering hospitalization and surgery and 
another covering accidental death or injury.5 In this way, JPI has expanded into the third-sector niche.  
 Of the various products, the most widely sold is endowment insurance (ordinary endowment 
policies were 43 percent of the number of policies sold by JPI since its start in 2007, with special 
endowment policies an additional 22 percent). Endowment policies are basically a vehicle for 
savings, since they provide payments at a specified point in time (retirement, entry to university, etc.) 
rather than at death.6 This array of products is basically similar to what other life insurers offer, and 
the riders enable JPI compete in the market occupied by specialized medical insurance firms. 
However, JPI continues to have a government-imposed limit on the size of policies it can offer 
(currently ¥13 million, roughly $130,000 at 2013 exchange rates).  
 Over the past decade, the number of JPI policies has declined. In 2003, Kampo had 68.5 
million life insurance policies and 7.3 million annuity policies outstanding. In 2012, there were 39.0 
million life policies (a 43 percent decline) and 5.3 million annuity policies (a 27 percent decline).7 
The overall face value of life policies also declined, from ¥185 trillion in 2003 to ¥109 trillion (a 41 
percent decline). However, the value of annuity policies rose from ¥2.6 trillion to ¥4.4 trillion (a 70 
percent increase), reflecting the popularity of annuities.8 
 To some extent, the entire life insurance industry has faced declining business over the past 
decade. For the period 2000 to 2012, the face value of all life and annuity policies in force (excluding 
JPI and small insurance cooperatives) declined 16.3 percent. However, JPI has experienced a much 
larger decline in business than the industry as a whole.9  
 JPI sells its insurance products at post offices nationwide. JPC (recall that this is the merged 
Japan Post Service and Japan Post Network firms) operates 24,514 post offices, of which 20,770 offer 
insurance services.10  
 In addition, due to the 2012 amendments to the 2005 Postal Privatization Law, it is now 
possible for postal carriers to perform insurance services, though such services are not being offered 
as of this writing. While not all employees of JPC would be available to carry out insurance 
transactions, JPC’s total employment in 2012 was 209,000, suggesting that it has a potential 
insurance sales and service staff that is the largest among firms in the industry. Nippon Life 
Insurance, the largest private-sector firm, had total employment of 69,620 in 2012, of whom 51,163 
were sales representatives. Nippon Life also sells policies through independent insurance agencies, 
but even then its sales force is dwarfed by JPI’s. 
 In addition, the Postal Privatization Law exempts JPI’s parent, Japan Post Holdings, from 
provisions of the Insurance Business Law and the Banking Law that restrict the extent to which 
insurance companies can combine with other businesses, including non-financial businesses, through 
a holding company structure.  Since 1998, changes in Japanese law have permitted financial holding 
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companies (with subsidiaries in banking, insurance, and securities), but prohibit them from owning 
non-financial subsidiaries. 
 Japan Post Holdings’ ownership of insurance, banking, and the non-financial businesses of 
mail delivery and operation of post offices (as well as hotels and hospitals) would be illegal for 
private-sector firms that adopt a holding company structure. This combination of businesses provides 
JPI with marketing, operational, and cost advantages over its private-sector competitors.  
 JPH owns a number of hotels (66 Kampo no Yado inns, mostly near tourist areas), plus 
Mielparque wedding halls and a handful of inns and recreation facilities in the Tokyo area. These 
low-priced facilities were built for the use of Kampo policyholders but are open to the general public. 
The 2005 Postal Privatization Law required JPH to sell or close the inns, many of which were 
operating at a deficit. However this was politically controversial. A sale was held in 2009, but then 
cancelled. and the 2012 amendments to the law eliminated the disposal requirement.11 
 JPG also runs 14 hospitals. Although built primarily to provide medical services to Japan Post 
Group employees and families, they are open to the public. Finally, JPI inherited from the postal 
system two long-running daily radio exercise programs, Minna no Taiso (Exercise for Everyone) and 
10 Million People's Radio Exercise.  
 These peripheral activities are holdovers from an era of greater paternalism. Private-sector 
corporations had (and some still have) hotels and other recreational facilities for their employees, and 
even provided housing.   
 
 
The Case Against Government Ownership  
 
The question of the appropriate role for government in providing goods and services in an economy 
has been the subject of enormous debate since the 19th century. The extreme of the state setting 
prices and output quantities for all goods and services has proven unworkable. But it can be argued 
that government ownership is justified in two circumstances.  
 First, if an industry has large economies of scale leading to a "natural" monopoly, then either 
the industry must be regulated or owned by the government in order to prevent abuse of monopoly 
power. A number of countries nationalized railroads, iron and steel production, telephone services, 
and airlines on the basis of natural monopoly arguments. In Japan, most of the rail network (Japanese 
National Railways), telephone and telegraph services (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone), an airline 
(Japan Airlines), and cigarettes (Japan Tobacco) were government-owned enterprises for much of the 
20th century, at least partly on natural monopoly arguments.  
 Second, a product or service might involve positive externalities (social benefits) that cannot 
be captured in its price. Private-sector firms will either under-produce or not produce at all if they 
cannot earn revenues sufficient to cover costs. In such cases, society might decide that broad national 
welfare justifies production, and, therefore, that government must provide it directly or through 
subsidies.  Public education is one common example. 
 Defining which economic activities legitimately are natural monopoly or have positive social 
externalities deserving government funding has been difficult and variable over time and across 
countries. In general, economists have become increasingly skeptical of both the concept of natural 
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monopoly and of positive externalities not captured by the private sector. As a result, most European 
nations that nationalized industries after World War II have sold those enterprises back to the private 
sector. Even in the case of perceived positive social externalities, the choice of public enterprise has 
been challenged due to inefficiency.  
 As put by Clair Wilcox, a leading economist of public enterprise in the mid-20th century: 
"How — without the reward of profit or the penalty of bankruptcy — are efficiency and progress to 
be obtained? How — when there is a monopoly, even though it be a government monopoly — are the 
interests of the consumer to be protected? And how — given the inconsistency of productive 
efficiency and public accountability — is the inevitable conflict between efficiency and 
accountability to be resolved?"12  
 Due to such concerns, many countries have reviewed and reduced the scope of public 
enterprise over the past several decades.  
 Similar to the European experience, the Japanese government has fully or partially privatized 
most of the enterprises it ran in the 20th century. The government sold all its shares in Japan Airlines 
by the early 1980s. In 1985 it embarked on privatization of Japanese National Railways (which was 
split into several regional companies), Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, and Japan Tobacco. 
Although the government still retains partial ownership in some of these companies, they have moved 
toward being true private-sector firms that compete with other firms in their industries.  
 
How do the economic arguments about public versus private ownership apply to the Japan Post 
Group, and to Japan Post Insurance in particular?  
 Postal services have been an area where governments have provided service for several 
hundred years. Due to the large fixed cost of maintaining a nationwide network of post offices, postal 
services were considered a natural monopoly. Furthermore, a private firm might serve only those 
areas where demand made service profitable.  In this case, national welfare (such as distribution of 
newspapers — commonly delivered by mail in the 18th century — to support the information flow 
necessary to run a successful democratic political system) may be enhanced by public ownership. 
 Now, even government operation of postal services has been challenged. Technological 
change (first in the form of radio and television, and now the internet, to distribute news; and first 
ever-cheaper telephone service then e-mail and now social media for personal communication) has 
enabled an alternative to mail delivery of letters, magazines, and newspapers.  
 Meanwhile, private-sector firms have competed for time-sensitive package delivery services 
(and do not seem to ignore rural areas). In a world with viable private-sector alternatives to 
government-run post offices, the justification for government ownership has weakened, and 
government-owned postal systems in advanced nations have experienced declining volumes of 
business and financial losses.  
 
The argument for a government-owned postal bank or postal insurance company is even weaker. The 
insurance industry has never been a natural monopoly; in all countries the market for life and other 
forms of insurance has been characterized by numerous firms and vigorous competition. The need to 
cope with a monopoly situation, therefore, simply does not exist for insurance.  
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 What about positive externalities? Back when both Japan Post Bank and Japan Post Insurance 
were established, private-sector banks and insurance companies were in their infancy. Postal savings 
began in 1875, just as the legal framework for modern banking was being extablished. Several 
decades passed before the commercial banks had expanded to cover all parts of Japan. Therefore, in 
the 19th century, one could argue that the post office offered an opportunity to quickly extend a 
public good (banking services, and especially the collection of deposits that could be used to invest in 
projects enabling the industrialization and modernization of the economy).  
 This argument cannot be made for postal insurance. The Japanese postal system began 
offering insurance in 1916. At that point, private-sector life insurance firms existed. Nippon Life 
Insurance, Japan's largest domestic insurance provider, was incorporated in 1889. Why the 
government should have entered an industry that had been established several decades earlier is 
unclear.  
 Unlike the creation of the Japanese National Railways in 1906 (through nationalization of a 
number of existing private railways), existing private-sector life insurance firms were never 
nationalized and folded into the government-owned postal system. The commonly made argument is 
that postal insurance offered small policies to lower-income families that were not being served by 
the private-sector. However, it is entirely unclear why government provision of these policies was the 
logical solution. A government regulation requiring all private-sector insurance firms to offer small 
policies would have served the purpose. 
 The use of the post office to serve lower-income households as a social policy is also evident 
through the maintenance of the network of hotels and recreational facilities. Historically, private-
sector hotels and inns have been relatively expensive. One could argue, therefore, that the post office 
was providing a social service to those who might otherwise be unable to vacation, and to equalize 
their opportunities relative to employees of large companies (who typically had both higher wages 
and benefited from periodic company retreats to company-owned hotels.  
 But can such a benefit be justified today? And even if it could, why should the provision of 
low-cost accommodations be a function of the Japan Post Group rather than the Ministry of Health, 
Labor, and Welfare. A better solution would be to offer incentives to the hospitality industry in the 
form of either tax breaks or subsidies to provide inexpensive rooms or to provide welfare benefits to 
low income families that they can use as they choose. In short, while provision of low-cost 
accommodations and recreation has a warm, fuzzy, paternalistic feel to it that may have appealed to 
the Japanese public in the past, there is no legitimate reason for the government-owned postal group 
to be providing these services today.  
 
One possible justification for a government-owned insurance company despite an existing private-
sector industry is provision of insurance to geographically underserved areas. For Japan Post Bank, 
for example, defenders of government ownership argue that private-sector banks do not have 
branches in many rural villages. This disadvantages those who might face difficulties in getting to 
more distant branch banks to make deposits or obtain cash. That argument might have been true for 
savings accounts in the early 20th century, but no longer, as commercial banks expanded their branch 
networks and have established extensive ATM networks.13  
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 For insurance, the argument for an underserved rural market was never valid. Banking 
services (mainly deposits and withdrawals) required being physically present at a bank office until the 
advent of ATMs. For a variety of reasons, Japanese long relied on cash transactions, so that relatively 
frequent access to a bank was important. Insurance is very different. Face-to-face transactions 
generally occur only once or twice: when someone buys the insurance policy, and when the benefit is 
paid (or, in the case of endowment policies, when the payments are to begin). 
 Furthermore, insurance policies are generally sold by licensed agents who can travel to the 
customer’s home if the purchaser is unable to get to the agency office.  
 Private-sector insurance firms in Japan have both their own sales and service personnel and a 
large number of independent agents trained and government-certified to sell policies and oversee 
disbursement of benefits. According to the industry association, in 2012, life insurance firms had 
236,000 in-house agents, plus an additional one million agents at independent agencies.14  
 The huge number of independent agents is partly a legacy of the marketing approach of the 
early post-war years in which insurance was sold by women working in their neighborhoods, and 
partly a consequence of deregulation allowing commercial banks to act as sales and service agents for 
insurance companies. It is difficult to believe that with such a large number of agents affiliated 
directly or indirectly with the private-sector firms that there is any corner of Japan underserved by 
these firms. 
 Furthermore, insurance transactions can be handled by phone or through the internet, both 
available throughout Japan. Therefore, the argument that private-sector insurance firms would fail to 
adequately serve rural areas is not credible.  
 The general conclusion is that Japan Post Insurance meets none of the conditions used by 
economists to justify government ownership. The insurance industry is not, and never has been, a 
monopoly in Japan or other countries. The private-sector market for life insurance works well and 
involves a sales and service network that is so large that underserved rural areas are not a legitimate 
concern. Due to the existence of agents who can travel and the infrequency of the need for contact 
between the seller and buyer of insurance, there is no social need unmet by the private sector. And the 
possible unavailability of small policies for lower income families need not have been met by the 
government-owned entity’s provision of these policies.  
 
 
The Unlevel Playing Field  
 
Kampo enjoyed a variety of benefits relative to the private-sector life insurance industry. As a 
government business, it did not pay taxes, was not regulated by the same government agency or on 
the same basis as the private-sector insurance firms, and did not pay into the insurance industry fund 
to protect policy holders when a life insurance firm went bankrupt. 
 Kampo was regulated by the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication (MPT) while private-
sector firms were regulated by the Ministry of Finance (MOF). All of Kampo life insurance policies 
received a 100% guarantee from the government. Some of the most egregious forms of favoritism 
have abated, but some remain.  
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 From 1998 the insurance industry has been regulated by the Financial Services Agency 
(FSA), to take over supervision of the financial sector from the Ministry of Finance. But JPI is a 
speical case in two ways.  
 First, the Postal Privatization Law requires the FSA to share supervisory authority over JPI 
with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC, the successor to the MPT) until 
completion of privatization (at which point FSA will have sole regulatory authority). Furthermore, 
MIC's supervisory role was expanded by the 2012 Revised Postal Privatization Law.  
 Prior to 2003, MPT did not have an arm’s-length relationship with Kampo because the postal 
insurance business was essentially an integral part of the Ministry. Nor has MIC established an arm’s-
length relationship with JPI because the Japan Post Group, including JPI, is run primarily by officials 
transferred from MIC when JPI was created in 2003. These historical personnel ties limit MIC’s 
desire or ability to act in a neutral manner in its regulatory role. In essence, MIC maintains a patron-
client relationship with JPI, promoting JPI’s interests rather than holding it to the rules and standards 
of the rest of the insurance industry.  
 Second, within FSA, JPI gets special treatment. JPI falls under a special office that deals only 
with JPI and Japan Post Bank. Many of the employees in this office are reported to be seconded from 
MIC. Therefore, JPI is not subject to the same FSA supervision as the rest of the life insurance 
industry. Indeed, in November 2012 an FSA official testifying before the Postal Privatization Services 
Committee (PSPC) admitted that, between 2007 and 2012, "there were instances when the FSA's 
supervision [of JPI] had shortcomings ...."15 
 Furthermore, since its license to sell insurance was granted by statute, JPI was not required to 
undergo the rigorous licensing process applicable to private insurers. 
 
The fact that JPI insurance is sold over the counter at the huge nationwide network of post offices 
may provide an additional benefit. Japanese post offices provide a variety of services besides mail: 
acceptance of tax payments and other government-related transactions, as well as JPB savings 
account transactions. Therefore, many citizens are likely to be in a post office fairly frequently, even 
in an age of online transactions. The ability of JPI to piggy-back on the physical presence of potential 
customers in post offices to push sales of its policies conveys some advantage relative to private-
sector insurance companies.  
 This aspect of JPI advantage underwent a significant change in mid-2013. On July 26, JPI 
and Aflac agreed to gradually expand the number of post offices offering Aflac cancer insurance to 
eventually include all post offices and direct JPI outlets handling insurance products.16 Further, 
MetLife Alico Life Insurance indicated it intends to offer more insurance products at post offices 
around Japan.17 This should be seen in the context of Japan’s accession to the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership regional trade negotiations discussed later. Put briefly, the Japanese government has been 
under pressure to make concessions up front to show good faith upon becoming a participant in the 
ongoing regional negotiations.  
 
The implicit guarantee of JPI policies by the government is a further advantage. Private-sector 
insurance firms are subject to the vagaries of market conditions. In the economic turmoil of the 1990s 
(recurring economic recessions, collapsing stock and real estate prices, plus plummeting interest 
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rates), seven domestic life insurers failed. All private-sector insurance firms suffered greatly in the 
1990s because they had guaranteed returns on their policies that were impossible to obtain as interest 
rates fell. This negative spread problem was a direct consequence of Kampo’s competitive pressure 
on private insurers, a market-power problem taken up in the next section.  
 Private-sector policyholders are protected by the Life Insurance Policyholders Protection 
Corporation (LIPPC), established in 1998 to replace the Policyholders Protection Fund. All life 
insurers operating in Japan, both domestic and foreign, are required by the Insurance Business Law to 
make payments into the LIPPC. Bailing out policyholders of the seven failed private-sector insurers 
cost private firms ¥538 billion in additional payments to the LIPPC. But Kampo was by law exempt 
until 2007, well after the bail out. 
 Besides the financial benefit of not paying into the safety fund in the past, JPI today is likely 
to still benefit from public perceptions of risk. Even though policyholders of the seven failed firms 
were protected by LIPPC, the possibility of owning a policy underwritten by a firm that might go 
bankrupt certainly remains an unsettling one. In fact, consumers are right to be concerned because the 
LIPPC only insures 90% of policy reserves as opposed to the full government guarantee of pre-
October 2007 Kampo policies. Although all policies issued by JPI since then only carry the same 
protection as private-sector policies, it is highly likely that the public still perceives JPI as having an 
implicit full guarantee by the government (since the government would not permit it to go bankrupt).  
 
Reflecting the difference in the guarantees for Kampo policies and new JPI policies, all policies in 
force as of October 2007 were separated from the newly created JPI. The pre-2007 policies were 
transferred to a newly created public entity, the Management Organization for Postal Savings and 
Postal Life Insurance (referred to in this paper as the Management Organization). The policies it 
holds continue to enjoy a 100 percent government guarantee.  
 The separation of Kampo policies into the Management Organization is a separation in name 
only. The Management Organization owns the pre-2007 policies, but all the work related to the 
policies (collection of premiums and payment of benefits) is contracted to JPI. The Management 
Organization is, in fact, a small organization with a staff of less than 30.18 
 JPI re-insures pre-2007 policies and charges the Management Organization for this. The fee 
is substantial. In fiscal 2011, reinsurance payments were ¥3.3 trillion (roughly $33 billion), 
amounting to 23 percent of all Management Organization ordinary expenses. 
 Further, JPI has made a large loan to the Management Organization. Most of the borrowing is 
loaned on to public organizations and local governments, the traditional recipients of loans from the 
government’s Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP). Prior to privatization, Kampo extended 
such loans directly.  
 Finally, the income statements show identical amounts of investment income and investment 
expenses (¥337 billion, roughly $3.4 billion), that match a line item in JPI’s income statement listed 
as interest income from the Management Organization.  
 Taken together, these accounts indicate that JPI is lending money to traditional FILP 
organizations, but doing so through the veil of the Management Organization, which does not take 
any middle-man cut of the interest earnings. This array of connections confirms the closeness of the 
relationship between the two organizations.19  
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The reason for creating the Management Organization to house the older policies is presumably the 
probability of future losses as the high guaranteed interest rates on old policies result in payments to 
policyholders that exceed premium income, although that point has not been reached (with premium 
income in fiscal 2012 of ¥14.3 trillion and payments to policyholders of ¥11.0 trillion).  
 This organizational mechanism for separating out problematic assets and liabilities of a 
corporation is not new. In the wake of World War II many Japanese corporations were allowed to 
create separate corporate entities to assume old business liabilities (because firms faced large losses 
as the government failed to pay on war materiel contracts or due to destruction of facilities). 
Similarly, when Japanese National Railways was privatized in 1985, its pension liabilities were 
separated into a new entity along with certain real estate in the hope that proceeds from selling the 
property would cover the pension costs.  The intent was to isolate problematic old assets and 
liabilities from a viable current business.  
 In the case of the Management Organization, however, the relationship with JPI remains very 
close. With payments for services and reinsurance going from the Management Organization to JPI, 
the government is in effect subsidizing JPI, and that implicit subsidy will become more explicit if the 
government puts additional money into the Management Organization to cover operating losses in the 
future.    
 
 
Market Power  
 
Economists worry about the performance of industries dominated by a single large firm or a small 
handful of large companies that has the power to set prices. In the ideal market situation (perfect 
competition) prices are set by the overall market forces of supply and demand, the economic outcome 
is of the greatest benefit to society, and competition forces firms to operate efficiently. When, 
however, a firm or group of firms can control prices, the result is detrimental to economic welfare. 
These firms raise prices and restrict output in order to maximize their profits; higher prices and lower 
output lower consumer welfare. This general problem is the reason many nations have competition 
laws that impose penalties on firms that attempt to behave in this anti-competitive manner.  
 Japan Post Insurance is, by far, the largest life insurance company in Japan by all the 
important measures — number of policies in force, face value of insurance policies, revenue, and 
assets. Given the diversity of products and the variable size of insurance policies, total assets are the 
easiest way to compare the relative size of firms. For purposes of assessing market power, it also 
makes sense to combine JPI and Management Organization assets because these organizations are 
separate in name only.  
 Table 1 shows that JPI has 29 percent of the industry’s assets. The largest private-sector life 
insurance firm, Nippon Life, is only 53 percent of the size of JPI, and the next largest, Dai-ichi Life, 
is only some 34 percent.   
 




 Although JPI alone is merely the second-largest life insurer by premiums, when the 
Management Organization is included, as it should be, JPI tops the table. Data are in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 here 
   
 The market share of JPI and predecessor Kampo varied considerably over the past two 
decades, rising in the 1990s and then falling more recently. Figure 1 shows the size of Kampo’s and 
then JPI’s total assets (not including the assets of the Management Organization to avoid double 
counting) relative to the assets of the whole life insurance industry.  
 
Figure 1 [was 2] here 
 
In the 1970s and 80s, Kampo's market share varied from 25 to 35 percent. In the 1990s, a sustained 
rise occurred, reaching 41 percent by fiscal 2002 (ended March 31, 2003). The substantial rise fueled 
concerns about the unfair nature of competition with JPI. Since that time, however, JPI's market share 
has dropped back into its earlier range.  
 The sharp 1990s rise in share occurred at a time when private-sector firms were under 
considerable stress. As the Bank of Japan cut interest rates over the course of the 1990s in response to 
the economic consequences of the collapse of real estate and stock market prices, insurance 
companies were burdened with guaranteed rates of return on their insurance policies that exceeded 
what they could earn on their investments. The eventual collapse of seven life insurance firms 
exacerbated a flight to security. 
 Because Kampo policies carried a statutory guarantee until 2007 and the implicit guarantee of 
the government that it would simply not fail under any circumstances, the public perceived its 
policies to be safer than those of private-sector companies. Indeed, the Kampo sales force touted the 
unconditional government guarantee on Kampo’s insurance policies. For example, a major Japanese 
business weekly reported on postal employees telling customers “Kampo will never go bankrupt, so 
it’s safe.”20  
 After 2002, however, the economy recovered, and no major bankruptcies of private-sector 
life insurance firms have occurred. (One small life insurance company failed in 2008). The recovery, 
as well as more competent oversight after regulatory authority moved from MOF to FSA in 1998, put 
the private-sector insurance industry in a more sound financial condition. These factors may help 
explain the subsequent fall in JPI's market share.  
 
Japan Post Insurance's size — even though its market share has been falling in the past decade — 
raises two concerns in terms of market power: pricing and product dominance and investment 
behavior. A firm with a very large market share in an industry may be in a position to control pricing 
or dominate product design, setting a standard (low prices or new products) that others in the industry 
must meet.  
 In the case of JPI, its ability to play a dominant pricing role is not just a matter of market 
share. Because JPI is not under pressure from shareholders to maximize profits, it is in a position to 
offer policies at prices yielding a lower profit. This has been alleged in the past, 1990s. From the 
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1970s, and especially in the 1990s, private-sector firms were periodically under pressure to match the 
high guaranteed rates of Kampo.  
 Thus, in November 1974, Kampo launched an aggressive pricing strategy, based on an 
increase in its assumed interest rate on policies. In response, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), which at 
the time was responsible for overseeing the regulation of private life insurers (but not Kampo), issued 
administrative guidance encouraging private life insurers to follow suit, which most did.21 
 In April 1984, Kampo again increased its interest rate, a move that was followed by similar 
action by the private insurers. A major life insurance company executive, looking back, noted 
“Fearing that there might be a shift of customers’ financial resources to Kampo, we [private life 
insurers] were in an endurance contest [with respect to who would first lower the assumed interest 
rates, Kampo or us].”22  
 Maintenance of unrealistically high assumed interest rates has also been blamed by the 
industry on the eventual failure of the seven insurers in the late 1990s (as market interest rates fell 
sharply when the Bank of Japan responded to the deepening banking crisis), on the grounds that 
private firms again felt compelled to match Kampo promises on interest rates.23  
 
A second form of market power may exist on the investment side. Individually or together (since they 
operate under the umbrella of Japan Post Holdings) these firms are major institutional investors in 
Japan, especially in bonds. If they move more heavily into corporate bonds, they are in a position to 
influence the terms of the issue. Since JPI allocates only a small portion of its portfolio to corporates, 
this may be more theoretical than real. But if JPI and Japan Post Bank evolve in the direction of 
private-sector financial firms' investment behavior, this could be a problem.  
 The extent to which JPI's current market power should be a concern is unclear. The 
extraordinary market share it held in the early 2000s is gone, and a falling market share suggests it 
may not dominate competition in the industry to the extent it once did. Nonetheless, its market share 
remains very large, and the potential for using its relative size to set industry prices for insurance 
policies or to influence the market for corporate bonds certainly exists.  
 
 
Cross Subsidization  
 
The Japan Post Group consists of three operating companies under the umbrella of Japan Post 
Holdings (JPH). JPI policies are sold over the counter in facilities owned and staffed by Japan Post 
Company (JPC) (Japan Post Networks prior to its merger with Japan Post Service on October 1, 
2012). Because JPC is a separate corporate entity, JPI pays for the use of facilities and personnel. 
However, in practical terms, the price for using the facilities and personnel of JPC is internal to the 
broader operation of JPH. By raising or lowering the prices for such services, JPH can shift costs and 
profits among the three operating companies. Setting prices at non-market levels to deliberately shift 
profits is a form of cross-subsidization.  
 In the case of the Japan Post Group, one obvious choice would be to charge artificially high 
prices to both JPI and JPB to subsidize JPC. Revenue from mail services is declining, and JPC is 
losing money on its mail services. In the fiscal year ended in March 2012, Japan Post Service (prior to 
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its merger with Japan Post Network) showed a loss of ¥22.3 billion ($280 million), though the 
company moved into the black the following year due mainly to reduction in personnel and overhead 
costs.  
 Paying an artificially high price for facilities and personnel services would appear to be a 
liability for JPI, relative to private-sector insurance firms. However, it is more likely that the cross-
subsidization of JPC is quite limited, as indicated by the loss recorded for Japan Post Services in 
fiscal 2011. Japan Post Holding's overall strategy may be to shift just enough money from JPI and 
JPB to JPC to plug most of the operating loss on mail services. That amount of subsidy is likely to be 
lower than market levels for the services involved. 
 Think of it this way. JPC owns an existing set of post offices that represent a sunk cost. Any 
price greater than zero for offering access to those facilities contributes to JPC overhead. A relatively 
low charge may be sufficient to offset most of the operating loss on mail services.  
 Imagine a market situation in which a firm owns a set of retail outlets and accepts bids from 
firms with goods or services to sell. The bidding process establishes a market price for access to the 
network of facilities and personnel, a price that ought to provide a profit to the owner of the facilities. 
Although this is a simplistic model, something of this sort characterizes the extensive convenience 
store chains in Japan (at least through negotiation with sellers, even if an overt auction market is not 
used). But JPC differs from this model in two important ways.  
 First, there is no competitive bidding by JPI or JPB to obtain access to post offices. As these 
two companies are 100% owned by the same parent, they do not have an arm’s-length relationship 
with JPC. Since the original Postal Privatization Law took effect, some private-sector insurance 
companies have gained access to some post offices, but only after (in contrast to JPI) a competitive 
bidding process or negotiation for each product.  
 The agreement reached with Aflac in July 2013 to eventually offer Aflac cancer policies in all 
offices handling insurance products significantly alters the problem of unequal access. However, the 
financial terms and how they relate to JPI’s access to post offices is not public, so it is not possible to 
ascertain whether JPI has lower-cost access.  
 Second, even if there is any desire to maximize profits on the part of Japan Post Holdings, it 
need not care which of its three subsidiaries produce profits. Therefore there is no need to make JPI 
pay a market rate to JPC for access, as the profits accruing to the group are the same.  
 A detailed analysis of costs and prices being paid by JPI for access to the network of post 
offices is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, the structure of the relationships within the 
Japan Post Group makes an artificially low price possible for the two reasons discussed above, and 





In the private sector, the pressures of competition with other firms, and pressures from shareholders to 
maximize profit, are supposed to force firms to behave in an efficient manner. In addition, private 
insurers are required to undergo a rigorous licensing process to ensure that they have sound internal 
controls and risk management systems, just in case market pressures are insufficient. In contrast, 
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Japan Post Insurance was granted its license by statute (a “deemed license”) and has not been 
required to make the fitness showing required of private insurers, thereby introducing the possibility 
of inefficiency or risky behavior.  
 Efficiency relates to the administrative cost of selling and servicing insurance policies and to 
investments. Data to analyze administration is not available, but investments can be analyzed. 
 Table 3 compares JPI to the rest of the industry as of March 31, 2013. In very broad terms, 
JPI behaves much like the rest of the industry. However, at a more detailed level, JPI behaves very 
differently, as seen in the allocation of investments in securities.  
 
Table 3 here  
  
 The only plausible explanation for the differences is that it results from JPI's special position 
as a government-owned entity. For the past three decades, Japan has had a large current-account 
surplus with the rest of the world, with a corresponding large net outflow of capital. Over those 
decades, the private-sector life insurance industry, looking to diversify its investment portfolio in 
order to maximize returns, has participated heavily in these investments abroad. JPI has not. If the rest 
of the industry can be described (however imperfectly) as consisting of profit-maximizing firms, then 
JPI is simply not a profit-maximizing firm.  
 A similar argument can be made concerning government bonds. JPI has a very high 72 
percent of assets in central and local government bonds, almost twice the level of the rest of the 
industry. Again, one can infer that JPI is motivated by something other than profit.  
 Even regarding the share of assets invested in loans, there is an obvious non-market aspect to 
JPI's behavior. At the end of fiscal 2011, an overwhelming 94 percent of JPI loans consisted of a 
single loan, the one to the Management Organization.24 This is an obvious policy decision, especially 
since the Management Organization loans on nearly the entire amount to FILP organizations. In 
essence, JPI is really making loans to public policy organizations (such as hospitals, highway 
organizations, local governments, and the like) through the veil of the Management Organization.  
 Furthermore, since 2007 JPI has actually shifted its portfolio in the direction of greater 
holdings of central and local government bonds, and away from foreign securities and loans. This is 
hardly the behavior of an organization adopting the investment behavior of the rest of the industry. 
Data are in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 here  
 
 If JPI has allocated its assets in an inefficient, government policy-driven manner, the result 
ought to be a lower rate of return on its investments than is the case for the rest of the industry. Data 
are in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
 These years, rocked by the 2008-09 global recession, are hardly ordinary years. Because of 
the drop in the stock market, the industry other than JPI shows a small loss for 2009, but it more than 
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made up for that with higher returns in subsequent years (due in part to recovery of the stock market). 
In 2009, JPI owned no equities at all, and therefore experienced no such losses. Over the four-year 
period, JPI’s average annual return was 8% less than the rest of the industry’s. 
 In absolute terms a difference of 13 basis points is small. But keep in mind that highly 
unusual conditions prevail in Japan, with extremely low long-term interest rates that have led to low 
returns for all financial institutions. The difference is that the private-sector life insurance industry has 
other assets (domestic equities plus foreign securities) that have helped it to escape the tyranny of low 
interest rates. To be sure, those other financial assets carry their own risks (stock market volatility, 
and exchange rate uncertainty), but the industry's somewhat higher return indicates the benefits of 
portfolio diversification.  
 The very high government bond holdings also inject greater risk into JPI's portfolio. First, 
economic theory teaches that portfolio diversity increases expected returns over longer time periods 
and dampens the volatility of returns. Second, should interest rates rise, JPI will be stuck with a 
portfolio of shrinking value (rising interest rates mean falling bond prices). The rest of the industry 
also faces risks, but the broader diversity of its portfolio – particularly with a significant portion of its 
assets invested abroad – helps protect against rising interest rates.  
 Although the huge government bond holdings carry risk, JPI faces risks if it were to diversify 
into equities, corporate bonds, and foreign investments. Until 2001, all the revenue of JPI’s 
predecessor (Kampo) and JPB’s predecessor (Yucho—Postal Savings) was turned over to the 
Ministry of Finance for investment through its Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP). 
Therefore, the managers gained no experience in investment. Beginning in 2001 the postal system has 
been permitted to invest some funds on its own. However, because it has continued to keep the bulk 
of its investments in government bonds, JPI still lacks both experience and trained personnel to 
managed a diversified portfolio. To be sure, JPI can hire new fund managers, but the potential to 
mismanage a broader portfolio is high. JPI could also hire outside managers, but whether it will do so 
is unclear.  
 In 2012, an FSA official testified before the government committee that oversees postal 
reform that an examination of the bookkeeping with respect to JPI's investment assets revealed that 
"segment accounting is not taking place on a per-product basis, raising concerns that [JPI] is unable to 
rationally calculate earnings per product including education endowment insurance. Accordingly, 
there is a risk that JPI's product designs may not be based on rational business judgment ....” That is, 
FPI probably is not matching its investments with its policy objectives.25 
 
Inefficiency also exists from the standpoint of the economy as a whole. Well-functioning financial 
markets seek to allocate financial capital to the most efficient uses (while taking funds away from the 
least efficient ones) in an ongoing process. To the extent that markets manage to allocate resources to 
those investments yielding the highest returns, and manage to quickly and continuously reallocate 
resources as new information becomes available, the economy as a whole benefits. Institutions that 
invest their financial resources on some other basis (old-boy ties or government pressure) are likely to 
be misallocating funds and, therefore, injecting inefficiency into the economy as a whole. 
 Japanese banks, which seriously misallocated loans in the 1980s (to the real estate industry 
and to stock market investors), are a perfect example of problems arising from lack of careful 
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evaluation of investment choices. JPI appears to be another example. Because JPI is so large, its 
inefficient allocation of financial resources matters.  
 
A second inefficiency relates to the market for government bonds. These have been quite attractive to 
private-sector financial institutions, but not to the extent that JPI indulges in their purchase. 
Combined with a similar preference for government bonds on the part of Japan Post Bank, this means 
the government is able to issue more bonds at extremely low interest rates than it might otherwise be 
able to do. 
 Perhaps one should be thankful for this situation, since fiscal deficits help make up for the 
chronic lack of domestic demand in the Japanese economy. But the government ought to face a 
market test for its bonds, and JPI’s massive government bond holdings help the government avoid 
that test. In fiscal 2010, JPI held 8 percent of all publicly held JGBs, and Japan Post Bank held 18 
percent, so these two organizations held over one-quarter of all JGBs held outside government.26 If 
keeping interest rates low (not just for government bonds) is a desirable monetary policy, that is the 
function of the Bank of Japan, not JPI or JPB.  
 
 
National Treatment  
 
Japan is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As such, the Japanese government is 
obligated to provide foreign goods, services, and service suppliers national treatment. That is, foreign 
firms are to be treated in the same manner as domestic firms. For goods, this obligation dates from 
1947 with the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Article 3 of GATT requires 
that imports be treated no less favorably than the same or similar domestically produced goods once 
they have passed customs. This principle was extended to services in 1994 with the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Article 17 of GATS states: “Each Member shall accord to 
services and service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of 
services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own like services and service 
suppliers.”27  
 In the case of insurance, Japan Post Insurance is a domestic firm receiving much more 
favorable treatment than all private-sector insurance firms, both domestic and foreign. National 
treatment matters because foreign insurance companies operate in Japan. The Life Insurance 
Association of Japan lists 18 foreign-headquartered companies with either ownership of domestic 
firms or branch offices that are members of the association.28  
 A strong case can be made that Japan is in violation of its WTO commitments. Although no 
case has been brought before the WTO by any of Japan's trading partners, the US government 
continues to express concern over the lack of national treatment. For example, the 2013 annual report 
to Congress by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) states:  
 “The U.S. Government has long-standing concerns about the postal insurance company’s 
negative impact on competition in Japan’s insurance market and continues to monitor the 
implementation of reforms closely. A critical objective, from the U.S. Government’s perspective, is to 
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establish equivalent conditions of competition between the Japan Post companies and the private 
sector, consistent with Japan’s WTO obligations.”29  
 Furthermore, on May 21, 2010, both the US Ambassador to the WTO and EU Charge 
d’Affaires met in Geneva with the Japanese Ambassador and underscored the “deep level of concerns 
that we [both US and EU] share regarding Japan’s preferential treatment of Japan Post Group in light 
of Japan’s national treatment commitments under the WTO.”30  
 The issue of national treatment and JPI is now moving to the negotiations related to the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a regional free-trade negotiation that includes 12 countries around 
the Pacific rim.31 A latecomer to a process started in 2009, Japan began full participation in 
negotiations in August 2013. TPP is a major regional negotiation aimed at eliminating or reducing 
trade barriers for most goods and services among its participants. This negotiation is expected to 
result in an agreement that explicitly includes state-owned enterprises in rules concerning national 
treatment, market access, and transparency.32  
 As part of the process of being accepted as a participant by the other governments already 
negotiating TPP, the US and Japan held a series of bilateral confidence-building negotiations in early 
2013 aimed at getting some preliminary commitment from the Japanese government on issues of 
importance to the United States. The result was a joint statement in April 2013 saying:  
 “... both governments have agreed to address level playing field issues in the TPP 
negotiations, as well as through parallel negotiations to the TPP talks. In addition, Japan unilaterally 
announced on April 12th that it will refrain from approving new or modified cancer insurance and/or 
stand-alone medical products of Japan Post Insurance until it determines that equivalent conditions of 
competition with private sector insurance suppliers have been established and Japan Post Insurance 
has a properly functioning business management system in place, which Japan expects will take at 
least several years to achieve.”33  
 This addressed the issue of restraining JPI’s expansion into new insurance products. 
However, exactly how issues related to national treatment and JPI will be handled remains uncertain 
since the two governments agreed that, in addition to the multilateral TPP negotiations, they would 
engage in bilateral negotiations to address certain non-tariff measures, including insurance, to be 
completed by the time the TPP agreement is concluded.34 The announcement in July 2013 that Japan 
Post would increase the number of post offices offering Aflac cancer policies should be viewed in this 
context. That is, the Japanese government needed to demonstrate to the US government that it would 
approach the TPP negotiations seriously. Offering up-front unilateral concessions has, in fact, been 
part of the Japanese government’s pattern of behavior in bilateral trade relations for the past half 
century. 
 US insurance firms officially welcomed Japan’s decision to join the TPP and its agreement to 
engage in the bilateral negotiations regarding non-tariff measures in light of their longstanding 
concerns about the various competitive advantages enjoyed by JPI.35 However, industry participants 
believe it is essential for any bilateral agreements regarding insurance to be incorporated in the TPP 
agreement to make them enforceable under TPP’s dispute settlement and arbitration mechanisms.  
 Japan’s accession to the TPP negotiations provides a means for the US government to address 
national treatment and level playing field issues concerning JPI through negotiations rather than 






The main conclusion of this paper is that Japan Post Insurance needs to be completely privatized and 
made subject to the same regulatory oversight as private insurers. The economic theory of public 
enterprises provides no support for public ownership of JPI. Furthermore, government ownership is a 
primary cause for the other issues and problems identified in this paper — the tilted playing field, 
potential excessive market power, inefficiency, and lack of national treatment.  
 Privatization must not be in name only. A fully privatized Japan Post Insurance needs to face 
rules that level the playing field. The implicit belief concerning the iron-clad guarantee of safety of 
postal life insurance needs to be ended.  
 The privatization proposed here goes well beyond what was envisioned even in the original 
2007 plan. That is, Japan Post Holdings should be abolished and the three operating companies sold 
off completely to private-sector shareholders. Thorough privatization of this sort would stop cross-
subsidization and force each of the three operating companies to stand on its own. Of the three, 
traditional mail services might deserve some government favoritism, either in the form of a subsidy or 
ownership. But there is no reason for either Japan Post Insurance or Japan Post Bank to benefit in any 
way from government favoritism relative to the rest of their respective private-sector competitors.  
 If JPI is not privatized, then three policies are critically important. First, the policy of 
restricting JPI's ability to create new policies must be maintained (as the Japanese government agreed 
to in its consultations with the US in April 2013). Given the tilted playing field, private-sector firms 
should not face a government-owned JPI that can create a wider array of competing products. Second, 
overall regulation must be improved by making JPI subject only to FSA regulation, and on the same 
terms as private-sector insurers. Third, private-sector firms should be offered the ability to sell 
policies through post offices on the same terms and conditions as JPI. That is, JPI should not have a 
nearly exclusive and low-priced access to sales outlets relative to private-sector firms. Of course, the 
same outcome should occur if JPI and the rest of the Japan Post Group are privatized.  
 Privatized and unbundled, Japan Post Insurance would be forced to compete with the rest of 
the insurance industry. Competing on equal terms with no special treatment by government could 
conceivably lead to financial problems for JPI, given its lack of experience in both competing equally 
in the insurance market and its lack of expertise in managing its investment portfolio. It may also 
result in regulatory sanctions for practices that are inconsistent with the Insurance Business Law. But 
these possibilities are nothing more than what all private-sector firms face in a market-based 
economy.  
 The big question in 2013 has been whether the LDP government under Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe would move decisively in the direction of renewed vigor on postal privatization. Some 
signs indicated renewed effort, including the management change at Japan Post, the Prime Minister’s 
statements, the pro-reform attitude of his Chief Cabinet Secretary, and the agreement to expand 
Aflac’s access to the postal network.  
 How the politics of reform play out over the next several years is uncertain. Analysts are 
divided on the degree to which the Prime Minister and his government would pursue structural 
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reform. Some have been encouraged by signs such as the willingness of the government to join the 
TPP negotiations. Skeptics, however, have argued that the government would rely most heavily on 
the first element of Abenomics – monetary expansion (which by mid-2013 had weakened the 
exchange rate and thereby encouraged exports) – rather than on structural reform. 
 This paper has argued strongly in favor of complete privatization and elimination of artificial 
advantages. But one can only hope that the reform agenda moves beyond rhetoric and results in 
decisive action concerning Japan Post Insurance.  
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Table 1: Life Insurance Company Assets, March 31, 2013






29.03 104.1 29.0 JPI plus Management Organization
90.5 25.2     Japan Post Insurance
13.6 3.8     Management Organization
52.738 54.9 15.3 Nippon Life Insurance
34.294 35.7 10.0 Dai-ichi Life
25.456 26.5 7.4 Sumitomo Life
6.916 7.2 2.0 Mitsui Life
358.6 100 Industry total
Share is the percentage of industry total assets.
All data are for March 31, 2013 except the Management Organization, which 
are March 31, 2012. Because it is not conducting new business, the 
discrepancy should be small.
Sources: Nippon Life Insurance, Financial Results for the Fiscal Year Ended 
March 31, 2013, p 2; Japan Post Insurance, Overview of Non-consolidated 
Financial Statements, p 1; Mitsui Life Insurance, Financial Results for FY2012, 
p 2; Sumitomo Life Insurance Company, Notice of FY2012 Financial Results 
(Preliminary), p 3;  Dai-ichi Life Insurance Company, Summary Financial 
Results for Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 2013, p 1;  Life Insurance Association 
of Japan, Overview of Life Insurance Business, March 2013; Management 
Organization, Fiscal Year Heisei 23 Financial Statement, p 33. 





6482 17.0 JPI plus Management Organization
3797 10.0      Japan Post Insurance
2686 7.1      Management Organization 
5343 14.0 Nippon Life Insurance 
3659 9.6 Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance
3647 9.6 Dai-ichi Life Insurance
3145 8.3 Sumitomo Life Insurance 
38069 100 Industry total
Share is the percentage of industry total premiums.
All data are for fiscal 2012 except the Management Organization, which are for 
fiscal 2011. Because the Management Organization's outstanding policies are 
slowly decliningg (as some are paid out), its premium income is slowly declining, 
leading to a slight overstatement relative to the other firms.
Sources:  Nippon Life Insurance, Financial Results for the Fiscal Year Ended 
March 31, 2013, p 31; Japan Post Insurance, Overview of Non-consolidated 
Financial Statements, p 6;  Meiji Yasuda LIfe Insurance Company, Soneki Kansho 
(Profit and Loss Statement), p 1; Sumitomo Life Insurance Company, Notice of 
FY2012 Financial Results (Preliminary), p 2;  Dai-ichi Life Insurance Company, 
Summary Financial Results for Fiscal Year Ended March 31, 2013, p 8;  Life 
Insurance Association of Japan, Overview of Life Insurance Business, March 
2013. 
Table 3:  Life Insurance Industry Assets, March 31 2013
Item
JPI All others JPI All others
724,181 2,850,740 0.8 1.1 Cash, Deposits
203,452 2,563,428 0.2 1.0 Call-Loans
427,417 2,597,973 0.5 1.0 Monetary Claims Bought
256,832 1,803,117 0.3 0.7 Money in Trust 
72,558,181 205,686,686 80.2 80.8 Securities
12,691,554 27,553,060 14.0 10.8 Loans
85,968 6,374,090 0.1 2.5 Tangible Fixed Assets
3,514,779 5,106,666 3.9 2.0 Other Assets
90,462,364 254,535,760 Total Assets
Securities Detail
56,472,609 92,296,633 62.4 36.3 Japanese Government Bonds
8,698,497 5,236,161 9.6 2.1 Local Government Bonds
6,483,840 18,671,357 7.2 7.3 Corporate Bonds
984 16,724,670 0.0 6.6 Stocks
902,249 55,084,225 1.0 21.6 Foreign Securities
Sources:  Japan Post Insurance, Overview of Non-consolidated Financial Statements, p. 4; 
Life Insurance Association of Japan, Overview of Life Insurance Business, March 2013.
Amount (million yen) Distribution (%)
All others is the industry excluding JPI.
Other assets are ¿¿¿  - line added because distribution did not add to 100
JPI excludes the Management Organization so as to focus on post-2007 investment 
behavior.
Table 4: Japan Post Insurance Assets
2008 2010 2012 2013 2008 2010 2012 2013
2,080,139 2,287,864 1,224,924 724,181 1.8 2.3 1.3 0.8
788,686 353,889 597,714 203,452 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.2
59,981 8,058 14,591 427,417 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5
1,861,542 175,038 242,747 256,832 1.7 0.2 0.3 0.3
85,568,884 80,341,503 74,587,160 72,558,181 76.0 79.6 79.6 80.2
19,921,240 16,260,524 13,929,040 12,691,554 17.7 16.1 14.9 14.0
97,892 99,297 85,832 85,968 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
2,146,306 1,443,609 3,006,664 3,514,779 1.9 1.4 3.2 3.9
112,524,670 100,969,782 93,688,672 90,462,364 –– –– –– ––
68,959,931 67,617,608 59,962,157 56,472,609 61.3 67.0 64.0 62.4
3,711,596 5,128,174 7,777,903 8,698,497 3.3 5.1 8.3 9.6
10,387,483 6,937,524 6,227,510 6,483,840 9.2 6.9 6.6 7.2
0 0 984 984 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2,509,872 658,195 618,605 902,249 2.2 0.7 0.7 1.0
Excludes Management Organization.
Sources:  Table 3, plus Japan Post Group, Japan Post Group Annual Report 2008, p 211; Japan Post Group 











Amount (March 31 of each year) (million yen)
Loans




Money in Trust 
Securities
2009 2010 2011 2012 Ave Return earned by
1.18 1.63 1.68 1.69 1.55 JPI
-0.02 3.20 1.48 2.06 1.68 Rest of industry
Ave is the average return of the four years 2009-11.
Table 5:  Return on Financial Assets 
(percent, for years ending March 31 of year shown)
Return is calculated as total investment income minus investment expenses 
(losses on valuation, etc) divided by total financial assets (total assets minus 
tangible, intangible, and other assets).
Source:  Japan Post Group, Japan Post Group Annual Report 2008, 2010, 
2012; Japan Life Insurance Association, "Summary of Life Insurance Business 
(Total Figures of 43 companies),"  
http://www.seiho.or.jp/english/statistics/summary/ (April 29, 2013).
Figure 1
Postal Saving as a Share of Total Bank Deposits
Sources:
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/index.htm 
Life Insurance ---- total assets
End of Fiscal Year














1965 2243 1153 34.0 33.951708
1966
3) Life Companies and Postal Life data from Japan Statistical Yearbook (website, '95 pp. 462 and 483, '84 pp. 409 
and 426), Finance and Insurance, tables for "Management of Assets of Postal Life Insurance" & "Policies in Force 
and Management of Assets of Life and Non-Life Insurance Companies"
Note:  this comparison is total assets of PO life





































1990 130,251 46,416 26.3 26.273158
1991 141,701 51,784 26.8 26.763832
1992 154,236 57,817 27.3 27.265353
1993 167,087 65,531 28.2 28.171079
1994 175,656 74,345 29.7 29.737881
1995 184,976 82,617 30.9 30.874126
1996 188,659 92,427 32.9 32.882107
1997 190111 98,797 34.2 34.196699
1998 191,768 105,748 35.5 35.543635
1999 190,033 111,737 37.0 37.027206
2000 191,731 115,593 37.6 37.612747
2001 184,371 120,819 39.6 39.588125
2002 179,831 124,091 40.8 40.829884
2003 184,330 120,197 39.5 39.470063
2004 191,523 119,915 38.5 38.503651
2005 209,879 118,877 36.2 36.159644
2006 220,217 115,257 34.4 34.356463
2007 213,899 112,525 20,512 38.3 34.472036
2008 205,142 106,577 18,479 37.9 34.190088
2009 318,380 100,970 16,098 35.0 31.713675
2010 320,691 100970 14221 34.4 31.485137
2011 326,953 93,689 13,597 31.5 28.655189
2012 29 29
2009-2012 industry total includes PLI
2012 is from table 1.
